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Introduction 
 
 
Potential for Nordic-Baltic Security 
Cooperation 
Shared Threat Perception Strengthens Regional Collaboration 
Christian Opitz 
All the Nordic and Baltic states are concerned about the deteriorating security situa-
tion in northern Europe. Most of all, military tensions in the Baltic region engender 
a collective threat perception vis-à-vis Russia. The pressure to respond is boosting a 
historically rooted security cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states. A shift-
ing of priorities is becoming apparent within the institutional cooperation, which is 
moving from a forum of exchange towards a shared framework of action. The countries 
involved are responding to traditional military threats and new security challenges 
with intensified and innovative cooperation. This problem-driven Nordic-Baltic security 
cooperation could also serve as a model for other regional formats, such as the Visegrád 
Group. 
 
In April 2015 the five Nordic defence min-
isters created waves with a joint piece in 
the leading Norwegian newspaper, Aften-
posten. The group, representing Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 
called Russia’s actions in Ukraine “the 
greatest challenge to the European security 
architecture”, and announced their inten-
tion to step up joint Nordic military exer-
cises and intensify their cooperation with 
the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
The Nordic and Baltic states point to 
numerous examples of increasingly ag-
gressive Russian behaviour in the region, 
including economic counter-sanctions in 
sensitive trade sectors, intimidatory politi-
cal rhetoric, and military violations of 
national airspace and territorial waters. 
Shared negative experiences have led to a 
strong convergence in formerly diverging 
assessments of Russia, which the Nordic 
and Baltic states have come to regard as a 
major instability factor in the region. 
This interpretation is increasingly re-
flected in joint actions. Yet while the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) would like 
to integrate the Baltic partners more close-
ly, the fact that some of the countries in-
volved are not NATO members remains a 
crucial impediment to regional military 
integration. 
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Drivers and Obstacles 
Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation began 
immediately after the Baltic states gained 
independence in 1991, with the Nordic 
support playing a decisive role in building 
national military capacities in the Baltic 
states. This applied not only to military 
equipment, but above all to the transfer of 
knowledge and experience. Nordic trainers 
helped to establish military infrastructure 
and standards, for example in the guise of 
the Baltic Defence College. In fact, without 
Nordic assistance the Baltic states would 
have found it almost impossible to be ready 
to join NATO by 2004. 
But once Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
were established as NATO members, inter-
regional cooperation ebbed and coopera-
tion shifted to the international level. 
Nordic-Baltic initiatives were now restricted 
primarily to foreign missions, such as secu-
rity sector reform projects in the Western 
Balkans or joint ISAF units in Afghanistan. 
Henceforth, the Baltic states prioritised 
security cooperation with the United States. 
In 2009, the Nordic states institutional-
ised decades of informal defence coopera-
tion by founding NORDEFCO to bolster 
national defence capacities, explore com-
mon synergies and promote efficient 
collective solutions. However, NORDEFCO 
is more framework than organisation, 
pursuing cooperation through regular 
meetings of defence ministers and military 
leaderships. Agreements are reached by 
consensus, and any member may withdraw 
from a project at any time without hin-
dering ongoing cooperation between the 
others. In fact, few of its projects encom-
pass all five partners; frequently they are 
bilateral or trilateral in nature. The spec-
trum of cooperation is broad and relates 
above all to military exercises, training and 
equipment. 
The NORDEFCO agreement explicitly 
provides for cooperation with third parties 
based upon a pragmatic approach. In this 
regard, the Baltic states have been increas-
ingly drawn in over recent years. Coopera-
tion began in 2011, initially restricted to 
selected areas. One year later Baltic officials 
were for the first time invited to attend the 
high-level Military Coordination Commit-
tee, which manages and facilitates military 
cooperation. Since 2014 they have been 
invited to, in principle, participate in all 
NORDEFCO projects. 
The Baltic states fundamentally welcome 
closer ties to NORDEFCO, which are pro-
gressively raising their military capacities 
to match high Nordic standards. Coopera-
tion also opens up a broader arena of for-
eign policy action and grants them supple-
mentary security options. However, the 
emphasis is on “supplementary”. The Baltic 
states regard NATO as their absolutely 
central pillar of national defence and are 
vigilant to avoid any steps that might water 
down the mutual defence clause (Article 5). 
Their relationships with NORDEFCO are 
therefore ambivalent, given that the format 
includes non-NATO Finland and Sweden. 
This places very narrow limits on any col-
lective defence aspect in Nordic-Baltic mili-
tary integration. 
Possibilities of Cooperation 
Nonetheless, the shared threat perception 
concerning Russia has increased the in-
centives for Nordic-Baltic cooperation. The 
flexible NORDEFCO format does in fact 
enable differentiated practical cooperation 
capable of addressing the perceived chal-
lenges. 
The development potentials are condi-
tioned by the perspective from which the 
“Russian threat” in the region is viewed. 
The narrow defence perspective perceives 
Russia primarily as the traditional military 
aggressor. The security angle, on the other 
side, comprehends Russia more broadly as 
latent uncertainty factor with hybrid threat 
potential. While outlined here as ideal 
types, the lines between the two naturally 
become blurred in reality. Both perceptions 
can propel Nordic-Baltic cooperation – but 
in different spheres and with different 
added value for regional security. 
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Russia as military aggressor: This percep-
tion favourises military cooperation, first 
and foremost to enhance regional and 
thus also national defence capacities. The 
NORDEFCO framework offers various start-
ing points, for example more joint military 
exercises, expanded Nordic support for 
control of Baltic airspace and closer co-
operation in maritime surveillance in the 
Baltic Sea. Additionally, there are options 
for combined military training, exchange 
possibilities for top officials, and improved 
coordination of defence procurement. 
However, two factors in the Nordic-Baltic 
context impede a significant expansion of 
regional “hard” defence capabilities. Firstly, 
the Baltic states’ aforementioned prioritisa-
tion of NATO leaves certain sensitive mili-
tary areas excluded. Fundamentally, they 
wish to avoid entering into ill-defined 
defence commitments. Secondly, the tra-
jectory of NORDEFCO to date offers little 
grounds for high-flying expectations. While 
the format is often discussed positively, it 
is as yet hard to demonstrate that Nordic 
cooperation has really enhanced national 
defence capacities: there is a lack of con-
crete examples of successes in important 
fields such as integration of operational 
decision-making or a joint arms policy. As 
long as certain areas of sovereignty remain 
taboo even among the Nordic states, 
broader and deeper cooperation is unlikely 
to lead to greater military integration in 
the region as a whole. 
On the other hand, Nordic-Baltic co-
operation in the international sphere ap-
pears less problematic. The Nordic and 
Baltic states are currently intensifying joint 
projects to expand military and security 
capacities in third countries. In addition, 
Sweden has asked NORDEFCO to investigate 
the possibility of a modular-style Nordic-
Baltic Battlegroup that could offer inter-
national organisations a rapidly and easily 
integratable unit. Extra-regional initiatives 
of this kind are politically less sensitive, but 
still capable of harmonising standards and 
building trust among the Nordic and Baltic 
states. These are necessary preconditions 
for military cooperation in their own neigh-
bourhood too. 
Russia as latent uncertainty factor: This 
interpretation adheres less to a classical 
military logic, but emphasises novel areas 
of threat: in the Baltic context above all 
cyber-attack and Russian-language political 
propaganda. The Baltic states have long 
been aware of forms of “hybrid threat”, 
which they currently complain are appear-
ing with increasing frequency. The latest 
joint initiatives are designed to meet these 
challenges. 
In spring 2015 NORDEFCO declared 
training in cyber-defence a new field of 
cooperation. The NORDEFCO Cyber Warfare 
Collaboration Project (CWCP) shall co-
operate closely with the Estonia-based 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence. Although the Centre primarily 
serves NATO members, Finland and Sweden 
are currently seeking the status of contrib-
uting participants. Moreover, the Baltic 
countries are participating in the hitherto 
purely Nordic CWCP, concentrating on 
joint analyses of cyber-threats to govern-
ment and business. The objective is to 
establish a regional ability to neutralise 
threats in real time. 
Nordic-Baltic cooperation is also unfold-
ing a new dynamism in the field of stra-
tegic communication. Especially the Baltic 
states fear that their Russian-speaking 
minorities – with which they have ambiva-
lent relationships – could be politically 
instrumentalised. At a meeting in May 
2015, all eight foreign ministers stressed 
their intention to undertake joint efforts 
to counter propaganda and deliberate dis-
information from Russian-language media 
by offering alternative sources of infor-
mation for Russian-speaking populations 
and supporting independent media. These 
plans are to be backed up by cooperation 
between representatives of the regional 
parliamentary bodies – the Nordic Council 
and the Baltic Assembly – and between 
Nordic and Baltic members of the European 
Parliament. 
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Nordic-Baltic cooperation in these non-
military, yet security-sensitive, areas pos-
sesses particularly large potential. Beyond 
the red lines of “hard” defence sovereignty, 
diverse possibilities exist for enhancing 
regional resilience. The traditional flexibil-
ity of the Nordic cooperation framework 
could thus be expanded with a Baltic 
dimension, perceived challenges tackled in 
a problem-led approach, and joint efforts 
better embedded. 
An International Model 
Given their similar threat perceptions 
concerning Russia, the Nordic and Baltic 
states increasingly find themselves in a 
situation of security interdependency. This 
shared perception encourages regional 
cooperation, both in the traditional area of 
defence within narrowly defined NATO 
bounds and also in the scope of a broader 
security cooperation beyond these insti-
tutional constraints. This does not mean 
that all contemporary initiatives and 
ambitions automatically become reality: 
any thought of a Nordic-Baltic defence 
union remains illusory. It is, however, 
becoming apparent that regional coopera-
tion is increasingly and decisively im-
portant. Security dependencies are not only 
being addressed at the level of discourse, 
but are actually generating closer real 
cooperation in a growing number of fields. 
Here Nordic-Baltic security cooperation 
would appear to be undergoing a funda-
mental shift from dialogue forum to frame-
work for joint action. 
The significance of Nordic-Baltic security 
cooperation extends out beyond the north-
ern European context. NATO and especially 
the United States are looking with great 
interest at forms of European regional co-
operation capable of bridging the capacity 
deficits and budget constraint of individual 
states and allowing them to shoulder 
greater security responsibility. In this 
respect the NORDEFCO format has already 
made greater progress than other coopera-
tion clusters such as the Visegrád Group or 
the cooperation around the Black Sea. 
So NORDEFCO possesses a model function. 
And this could be further reinforced 
through the various potentials of an ex-
panded Nordic-Baltic security cooperation. 
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